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DEVELOPMENTS
decision was motivated by political expediency will certainly not be de-
nied. The full impact of the decision will rest upon the decisions of the
Claims Tribunal and resulting future litigation.
Sharon D. Liko
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc.:
Another Chapter in the Continuing Conflict
between FCN Treaties and Title VII
The Fifth Circuit, in Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc.,' re-
cently held that the 1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion (FCN) between the United States and Japan' grants wholly owned
American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations "the limited right to dis-
criminate in favor of Japanese nationals" in filling managerial and techni-
cal positions.' By contrast, the Second Circuit in Avigliano v. Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc.4 held that the Japanese Treaty does not exempt
wholly owned American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations from laws
prohibiting discrimination in employment.5 Spiess is unique because it
thrusts the Second and Fifth Circuits into discord regarding the applica-
bility of domestic employment discrimination laws to wholly owned Japa-
nese subsidiaries incorporated in the United States. Unlike Avigliano,
Spiess holds that "Article VIII [of the Japanese Treaty] does exempt C.
Itoh-America from domestic employment to the extent of permitting dis-
crimination in favor of Japanese citizens in employment for executive and
technical positions."
1. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
2. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as Japanese Treaty].
3. 643 F.2d at 355.
4. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981).
5. In Avigliano, female secretarial employees of Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., a wholly
owned subsidiary of a Japanese commercial firm, appealed from an order entered by the
district court dismissing their claim of discrimination on the basis of sex and national origin
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et
seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq., and the Thirteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. 638 F.2d at 553. The Second Circuit held that the Treaty did not
exempt Japanese companies operating in the United States "whether or not they are incor-
porated in the United States, from American laws prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment." Id. at 554. The present note should be read in conjunction with that published in
volume 10, number 2 of this journal on the Avigliano case. Development, The Impact of
Title VII Protection on FCN Treaties: Conflict and Interpretation, 10 DEN J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 373 (1981).
6. 643 F.2d at 359.
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While Spiess and Avigliano reach opposing conclusions regarding the
applicability of domestic employment discrimination laws to wholly
owned American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations, the Second and
Fifth Circuits leave two major issues unresolved. First, may a less-than-
wholly owned American subsidiary of a foreign corporation seek exemp-
tion from domestic employment discrimination laws by raising FCN
treaty provisions as a shield? Second, does Title VII supersede inconsis-
tent FCN treaty provisions? These are the questions left open in the
wake of Avigliano and Spiess.
In Spiess, American male employees of C. Itoh-America filed a class
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 and section 1981 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.8 The employees charged nationality discrim-
ination, alleging that the company made "managerial promotions and
other benefits available only to Japanese citizens." In response, C. Itoh-
America filed a rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. 10 C. Itoh-America argued that the lan-
guage of article VIII(1) of the 1953 FCN Treaty, which permitted compa-
nies to "engage . . . executive personnel . . . and other specialists of their
choice,"1 granted absolute immunity to C. Itoh-America from American
employment discrimination laws. 2
As with Avigliano, the court of appeals in Spiess faced two difficult
issues. First, could a wholly owned Japanese subsidiary incorporated in
the United States take advantage of the provisions of the Japanese
Treaty? Second, if so, did the Treaty provisions exempt the Japanese
company from American employment discrimination laws?
The Spiess court began its discussion with a brief analysis of the his-
tory of friendship, commerce and navigation treaties."3 The court noted
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1976).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. (1976).
9. 643 F.2d at 355.
10. Id.; see Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 469 F.Supp. 1 (S.D. Texas 1979). For
a discussion of the background of the district court's holding, see Note, Commercial Trea-
ties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 947 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note].
11. 643 F.2d at 355.
12. Id.
13. FCN treaties are commercial agreements "designed to create a legal environment
that encourages mutually beneficial trade and investment." Note, supra note 10, at 949. The
Japanese Treaty is one of many FCN treaties negotiated between the United States and
other countries on a bilateral basis beginning with the first FCN treaty with France in 1778.
See Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV.
805, 806 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Walker, Modern Treaties]; Walker, Provisions on Com-
panies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 373, 374 (1956) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Walker, Provisions on Companies]. In one of his articles, Walker outlined the
purpose and nature of FCN treaties:
These treaties . . . are 'commercial' in the broadest sense of that term; and
they are above all treaties of 'establishment,' concerned with the protection of
persons, natural and juridical, and of the property and interests of such per-
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that FCN treaties are self-executing, 4 "the Supreme law of the land,"
and supersede inconsistent state law.' The court also noted that federal
statutes should not be construed to "violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains," for "only when Congress clearly in-
tends to depart from the obligations of a treaty will inconsistent federal
legislation govern."' 0 The court reasoned that article VIII(1) 17 of the
Treaty was not subsequently repudiated by Title. VII, for Congress did
not expressly repudiate the "of their choice" language of FCN treaties
when it enacted Title VII. Accordingly, the court was reluctant to act in
the absence of congressional mandate, for "[i]n the absence of Congres-
sional guidance, we decline to abrogate the American government's sol-
emn undertaking with respect to a foreign nation.""'
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, relying
primarily on article XXII(3) of the Treaty,10 denied C. Itoh-America's
motion to dismiss.2 0 The district court reasoned that since C. Itoh-
America was a New York corporation, it was a "company of the United
States"'" and did not have standing to assert the provisions of the Japa-
nese Treaty. In the district court's view, "[ajrticle XXII(3) unequivocally
states that for the purpose of the Treaty the nationality of the corpora-
tion is determined by the place of incorporation. 2 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit rejected the district court's construction of article XXII(3) of the
treaty, noting that treaties, unlike domestic legislation, "must create a
common ground between differing cultures before the rights of the parties
can be defined."' "2 The court reasoned that the negotiating history of the
sons. They define the treatment each country owes the nationals of the other;
their rights to engage in business and other activities within the boundaries of
the former and the respect due them, their property and their enterprises.
Walker, Modern Treaties, id., at 805-06.
14. 643 F.2d at 356. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., Ltd., 494
F. Supp 1263, 1266 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. II.
16. 643 F.2d at 356, citing The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804),
quoted in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21
(1963). Since the Japanese Treaty was ratified after the enactment of section 1981, "it su-
persedes the Federal Statute." 643 F.2d at 362 n.2. See Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315,
324 (1904).
17. Article VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty provides: "[Nlationals and companies of ei-
ther party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other party, account-
ants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists
of their choice." Japanese Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII para. 1 (emphasis added).
18. 643 F.2d at 362.
19. Article XXII(3) of the Japanese Treaty provides: "[C]ompanies constituted under
the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either party shall be deemed
companies thereof and shall have their juridical status recognized within the territories of
the other party." Japanese Treaty, supra note 2, art. XXII para. 3.
20. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D. Texas 1979).
21. Id. at 6.
22. Id.
23. 643 F.2d at 356.
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Treaty indicated an attempt to create a common ground between Japan
and the United States, as "the provision was intended, not to determine
which forms of corporate organization were entitled to assert Treaty
rights, but to ensure that unfamiliar organizations would be recognized as
'companies' by the legal institutions of the respective countries. 2 " The
court relied on various articles written by Mr. Herman Walker, a leading
authority on FCN treaties and former Advisor on Commercial Treaties to
the State Department. 5 The court cited Walker for the proposition that
the term "companies" in the FCN treaties had to be broadly interpreted
to encompass the "varied purposes of an FCN treaty. 2 6 The court noted
that the State Department has consistently recognized the right of Amer-
ican subsidiaries of Japanese corporations to enjoy full protection of the
provisions of the Japanese Treaty.27 C. Itoh-America concurred in this
view, maintaining that various Treaty provisions, when read together, cre-
ate a right of "companies of Japan" to employ Japanese citizens "of their
choice." s The Fifth Circuit noted that the issue of corporate nationality
need not be considered, as it determined that C. Itoh-America could as-
sert Treaty rights on other grounds.2 9
Both Spiess and Avigliano hold that a wholly owned American sub-
sidiary of a Japanese corporation has standing to raise the Japanese
Treaty provisions. Like Avigliano, the Spiess court recognized that the
lower court's interpretation of article XXII(3), which denied standing to
24. Id. This intent was demonstrated in a memorandum prepared by State Department
negotiators. See Dispatch No. 13, Office of the United States Political Advisor for Japan, at
5 (Apr. 8, 1952).
25. According to a State Department cable, Mr. Walker formulated the modern concept
of FCN treaties. Walker also negotiated many such treaties on behalf of the United States.
See Airgram from Secretary of State Kissinger to American Embassy in Tokyo, No. 1-105
(Jan. 9, 1976), cited in 643 F.2d at 357 n.2. Walker is a former Foreign Service Officer and
former Advisor on Commercial Treaties, Office of International Trade and Resources, De-
partment of State. See Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign
Investment: Present United States Practice, 5 Am. J. Coup. L. 229 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as Walker, United States Practice].
26. According to Walker,
A 'company' is defined simply and broadly to mean any corporation, partner-
ship, company or association which has been duly formed under the laws of
one of the contracting parties; that is, any 'artificial personal acknowledged by
its creator, as distinguished from a natural person, whether or not for pecuni-
ary profit.' Every association meeting this simple test of valid existence must
be accounted by the other party a company of the party of its creation, and
have its juridical status recognized without any reservation for the laws of the
forum.
Walker, Provisions on Companies, supra note 13, at 380-81.
27. 643 F.2d at 357-58. See Letter from Lee R. Marks to Herbert J. Hansell (Oct. 17,
1978), reprinted in 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 281 (1979). But cf. Letter of James R. Atwood to Lutz
Alexander Prager (Sept. 11, 1979), reprinted in 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 158 (1980). The Spiess
court viewed the latter letter as "an aberration in State Department policy." 643 F.2d at 358
n.3.




C. Itoh-America, "would create an unreasonable distinction between
treatment of American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations on the one
hand, and branches of Japanese corporations on the other."30 Citing Avig-
liano, Spiess noted that such an interpretation of the Treaty provision
would create a "crazy quilt" pattern allowing Japanese corporations to
enjoy Treaty protection while wholly owned Japanese subsidiaries incor-
porated in the United States would only be able to secure minimum pro-
tection under the Treaty.31
The Spiess court differed from Avigliano on the issue as to whether
C. Itoh-America was bound by American employment discrimination
laws. While the plaintiff (Spiess) argued and Avigliano held that article
VIII(1) of the Treaty only provides for national treatment to Japanese
corporations, the Spiess court held that this provision did in fact exempt
C. Itoh-America "to the extent of permitting discrimination in favor of
Japanese citizens in employment for executive and technical positions."'
Citing Walker, the court noted that rights of foreign nationals under
these FCN treaties were measured by so called "contingent standards.' 3
The first-the "national treatment" standard-guaranteed foreign na-
tionals "the same treatment afforded to native citizens."'" Article VII(1)
of the Japanese Treaty reflects this standard, for it provides that "nation-
als and companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment
with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial
and other business activities." 5 The second-the "most favored nation"
standard-grew out of the nationalistic post-war period which "prevented
universal application of the national treatment rule."' The court sug-
gested that this standard is found in several of the Japanese Treaty pro-
visions.'" The court also noted that there were "absolute rules" which
were created "to protect vital rights and privileges of foreign nationals in
any situation, whether or not a host government provided the same rights
to the indigenous population."" The court quoted Walker for the pro-
position that, under these absolute rules, "foreign nationals were to re-
ceive not only equal protection, but also a certain minimum degree of
protection, as under international law, regardless of a Government's pos-
30. 643 F.2d at 358.
31. Id., citing Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 683 F.2d 552, 556 (2d Cir.
1981).
32. 343 F.2d at 359.
33. Id., citing Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 13, at 810-11.
34. 643 F.2d at 359.
35. Japanese Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII, para. 1.
36. 643 F.2d at 359, 360. See Walker, United States Practice, supra note 25, at 236.
37. The court cites the following Japanese Treaty articles as illustrative of the "most
favored nation" standard: art. VII(2) (granting most favored nation treatment for foreigners
who seek to operate a public utility in the host country, or who engage in shipbuilding and
other designated areas); art. XIII (granting this treatment to foreign travelers entering and
leaving the country); art. XIV(5) (granting this treatment in export and import matters).
643 F.2d at 360.
38. 643 F.2d at 360, citing Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 13, at 811, 823.
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sible lapses with respect to its own citizens.""9 The court added that abso-
lute rules could also be found in various provisions of the Japanese
Treaty."
While Avigliano held that the "of their choice" provision of article
VIII(l) must be read as granting national treatment to companies of ei-
ther party, the Spiess court reached the opposite conclusion:
National treatment was not the Treaty's exclusive measure of the
rights to be accorded to foreign nationals. It is apparent that article
VIII(1)'s 'of their choice' provision was intended, not to guarantee na-
tional treatment, but to create an absolute rule permitting foreign na-
tionals to control their overseas investments. . . .The language of ar-
ticle VIII(1) makes clear that the of their choice provision was
designed to establish such a rule. Use of the phrase 'of their choice'
does not express the requirement that the parties are limited to na-
tional treatment. . . .Considering the Treaty as a whole, the only
reasonable interpretation is that article VIII(1) means exactly what it
says: companies have a right to decide which executives and techni-
cians will manage their investment in the host country, without regard
to host country laws."
4 1
The Avigliano court had reasoned that the Japanese Treaty could be con-
strued in accordance with American employment discrimination laws, for
the "bona fide occupational qualification" (bfoq) Title VII exemption is
"broad enough to encompass any rights that Japanese corporations legiti-
mately could assert under the Treaty. 4 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, not-
ing that "[this] argument misapprehends the nature of a right created in
the course of international bargaining,'4 since the purpose of the Treaty,
from the American perspective, was to "facilitate American private-sector
investment in foreign nations." The court further reasoned that Japa-
nese companies also have a right under article VIII(l) to pick and choose
their essential personnel in order to manage their own affairs.4
5
The plaintiff in Spiess had also argued that article VIII(l) would
conflict with article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations,' which ar-
39. Walker, United States Practice, supra note 13, at 232.
40. The court cites the following Japanese Treaty provisions to illustrate the prevalence
of "absolute rules" in the Treaty: art. I (permitting foreign nations to enter and leave the
host country freely); art. 11(2) (providing for notification of an alien's consulate in the event
of his arrest); art. VI(3) (guaranteeing just compensation for expropriated property); art.
XX(a) (guaranteeing freedom of transit through the host country for each party's nation-
als). 643 F.2d at 360.
41. Id. at 360-61.
42. 638 F.2d 552, 559. For further elaboration of the use of the "bfoq" Title VII excep-
tion in Avigliano, see Note, note 5 supra.
43. 643 F.2d at 361.
44. The Spiess court noted that the "of their choice" provision of the Japanese Treaty
sought to ensure domestic control of American businesses in host countries. 643 F.2d at 361.
45. Id. at 362.
46. Article 55 of the United Nations Charter provides, in part, that "the United Na-
tions shall promote . . .universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
VOL. 10:585
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guably prohibited employment discrimination. The court disagreed, not-
ing that the "national origin distinction" at issue in the case did not fall
within the enumerated categories of "race, sex, language, or religion."
Second, the Charter, though ratified by the United States, "is not self-
executing.' 7 Article 55 of the Charter was found to be inapplicable in
this case. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit permitted C. Itoh-America to as-
sert the Treaty in its favor and the court reversed the district court hold-
ing and remanded the case with directions to dismiss.'8
The Second and Fifth Circuit holdings leave two major unresolved
issues in their wake. First, may a less-than-wholly owned American sub-
sidiary of a foreign corporation seek exemption from domestic employ-
ment discrimination laws by raising FCN treaty provisions as a shield?
Second, does Title VII supersede inconsistent FCN Treaty provisions?
The notes to treaty trader regulations" may provide an answer to the
first question. According to the regulations, corporate nationality is deter-
mined by the nationality of the majority (more than fifty percent) stock-
holders, "regardless of the place of incorporation." 50 It is not clear
whether or not these regulations resolve the issue after Spiess.1 Thus,
whether or not a less-than-wholly owned American subsidiary of a foreign
company may assert FCN treaty protection is still an open question.
The Second and Fifth Circuits came to opposite conclusions on the
question of whether or not Title VII supersedes inconsistent FCN treaty
provisions. Yet, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York recently faced the same issue and reached a conclusion
which supports the Second Circuit's position. In Linskey v. Heidelberg
Easter, Inc.,52 a disgruntled employee brought a Title VII action against
an American subsidiary and its Danish parent. The defendants moved to
dismiss under Rule 12(b), arguing in part that the Danish FCN Treaty
8
exempts Danish corporations from the provisions of Title VII. Article
VII(4) of the Danish Treaty provides: "Nationals and companies of either
Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territory of the other
Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, at-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N.
CHARTER art. 55(c).
47. 643 F.2d at 363.
48. Id.
49. "Treaty traders" are aliens permitted by section 101(a)(15)(E)(i) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952 to enter the United States in a supervisory capacity pursu-
ant to a commercial treaty. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(i) (1976). The regulations cited to are
found in § 22 C.F.R. § 41.40 et seq. (1980).
50. 22 C.F.R. § 41.40(8) (1980).
51. The court stated in a footnote that "we do not reach or decide whether a corporate
subsidiary in which a Japanese trader owns less than a 100% interest should be considered
a company of Japan under the Treaty." 643 F.2d at 359 n.5.
52. 470 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
53. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, with Protocol, Oct. 1, 1951,
Uniied States-Denmark, 12 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797, 421 U.N.T.S. 105.
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torneys, agents and specialized employees of their choice, regardless of
nationality.""
The parent company claimed exemption from Title VII restrictions
as plaintiff's job fell within the "executive personnel" category.5 8 Yet, the
district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the
Danish Treaty did not exempt a Danish corporation from the provisions
of Title VII. 6" According to the court, "while this defense to a Title VII
action is a novel one, the history of the provision belies any claim that a
foreign corporation has an absolute privilege to hire professional and
other specialized employees of their choice irrespective of the American
laws prohibiting employment discrimination. ' 7 The court added that the
purpose of the Danish Treaty's provision was to "exempt specialized em-
ployees of foreign countries and companies 5 8 from the admission re-
quirements of the host country in special areas of employment. "It was
not intended to immunize foreigners from claims under the host country's
employment discrimination laws."5 Thus, the district court's interpreta-
tion in Linskey of the legislative history of Title VII directly conflicts
with that of the Fifth Circuit. According to Linskey, since Title VII was
enacted without reference to the "of their choice" provision, "the only
inference to be drawn is that such a provision was not intended to exempt
foreign countries and companies from the requirements of Title VII.""
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the legislative his-
tory of the Treaty and Title VII and their subsequent analysis of the
interrelationship between treaty law and domestic employment discrimi-
nation laws is not widely ascribed to, as evidenced by the Avigliano and
Linskey decisions.
The Linskey decision further complicates the Avigliano-Spiess dis-
pute because it strongly argues in support of the proposition that the "of
their choice" provision was not intended to supersede Title VII restric-
tions on employment discrimination. Although the Spiess court reached a
different conclusion, the Avigliano and Linskey holdings weaken its ef-
fect. As a result, the questions whether or not Title VII supersedes incon-
sistent FCN treaty provisions and whether a less-than-wholly owned
American subsidiary of a foreign corporation may seek exemption from
domestic employment discrimination laws have yet to be conclusively
resolved.
George M. Kelakos
54. Id. art. VII para. 4.




59. Id. at 1186.
60. Id. at 1187.
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